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ABSTRACT 
Decision making is traditionally viewed as a rational process where reason calculates the best way to 
achieve the goal. Investigations from different areas of cognitive science have shown that human 
decisions and actions are much more influenced by intuition and emotional responses then it was 
previously thought. In this paper I examine the role of emotion in decision making, particularly 
Damasio’s hypothesis of somatic markers and Green’s dual process theory of moral judgment. I conclude 
the paper with the discussion of the threat that deliberation and conscious rationality is an illusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the one hand, decision making is a process we are quite familiar with, because we often 
find ourselves in situations which can be described as decision making. For example, at this 
very moment I am deciding whether to attend a lecture or stay at home and write an article. I 
weigh my options: on the one hand, I would like to hear the lecture of a colleague I esteem 
highly and whose lectures are always well-prepared and interesting, but, on the other hand, I 
am haunted by the feeling of obligation, as – yet again! – I am late with my article and 
therefore have to finish it as soon as possible. I have to decide between these two choices and 
soon realize that I will be staying at home in front of my computer. This is my choice, and I 
feel it to be the final result of conscious deliberation and freewill, because I could have 
decided otherwise and went to the lecture, while staying up late to finish the article. On some 
other occasion, I decided to buy a book without any special deliberation, but with the distinct 
feeling that this was my decision. However, if we take a better look at the matter at hand and 
are not satisfied with such fairly stereotypical examples, we are faced – as with all other 
philosophically interesting notions – with a serious task. One does well to remember 
St. Augustine’s often-quoted answer to the question on what is time: St. Augustine responded 
that, before the question was posed, he had been using the notion with no problems 
whatsoever, but as soon as he was confronted with the issue, he was dumbfounded. 
The investigation of decision making is by no means limited solely to philosophy; it presents 
a challenge to scientists from a wide variety of disciplines who try to tackle the phenomenon 
from the third-person perspective (neuroscientists, psychologists, sociologists, economists, 
computer scientists) as well as to researchers who attempt to solve it with the first-person 
approaches. In the present article, we will be focusing primarily on the relationship between 
the conscious (voluntary) and unconscious (automatic) decision making processes. It will be 
shown how the dominant view in Western philosophy and science, according to which 
decision making was mainly a process of instrumental rationality, ignored the importance of 
emotions that often play an important role in decision making on unconscious level. On the 
other hand, recent investigations in the field of neuroscience have raised doubts as to whether 
the experience of conscious decision making is not merely an illusion. In my opinion, this 
conclusion is invalid and can be avoided, although many questions related to the 
philosophical problem of free will remain open. 
RATIONALITY 
A common person from the street would probably give a more balanced view on decision 
making then philosophers and scientist who mainly deal only with the rational part of the 
decision making (at least until recently). Decision making was from Plato on regarded as a 
rational process although the influence of emotions was not totally rejected. The role of 
emotions was in setting the goals and in motivation, whereas in reaching practical decisions, 
reason and emotion were in opposition. The age of enlightenment and rationalism stressed 
reason even more and later, as Scheff [1] points out, the requirement that we should act in 
accordance to reason changed into the statement that we actually do act in accordance to 
reason, and emotions have slowly disappeared from the serious discussions. The result is 
overvaluation of the self control and of the awareness of the situation and negation of the 
other side of human behaviour, i.e. impulsiveness and lack of self control. But as a man from 
the street could tell us, there are many important decisions in life where we do not deliberate 
about alternatives and do not think about the consequences. 
 O. Markič 
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Nevertheless when philosophers talk about decision making, they usually think about rational 
decision making. So let us first look at different senses of rationality. 
Ronald de Sousa [2; p.7] distinguishes between categorical sense and normative sense. 
Taking the categorical sense, the contrary of rational is arational. The criterion for the 
inclusion into the category rational is in the ability to behave because of reasons and the 
explanation of behaviour refers to goals, norms or values (e. g. example, the behaviour of a 
person who helps the child to open the door). Arational behaviour is caused neither with 
choice nor with deliberation and could not be explained on the basis of reasons (e. g. the fall 
of the rock). Having normative distinction in mind, one can distinguish rational from 
irrational behaviour. In this case the criterion is the answer to the following question: Is the 
belief or behaviour appropriately grounded in specific reasons, norms or values. Agent who is 
not rational in a normative sense could be criticized. Aristotle’s characterization of humans as 
rational animals took categorical sense. Just because humans are rational (in categorical 
sense) we can sometimes describe their behaviours as irrational (e.g. when we incautiously 
run across the street). 
Second line of the distinction goes with the usage of the notion of rationality and refers to 
thoughts or actions [2; p.121]. In the first case we talk about epistemic rationality, where the 
question is in the matter of fitting representation with the world. The goal is to reach the truth 
and avoid falsity. Epistemic rationality is the concern of logic and epistemology. Second 
form is strategic rationality where the concern is the fitting of the world and the goals set by 
the agent’s desires and choices. Disciplines dealing with these questions are decision theory 
and game theory, first is concerned more with individual decision maker and second with 
decision making in different social groups. 
The third distinction is between theoretical and practical approaches. The theoretical 
approaches include scientific questions as are questions about explanation or prediction. The 
methods used are impersonal and in principle accessible to everybody. Practical deliberation 
concerns our individual actions like what should I do or what is the best to do. 
Decision theory and game theory are normative theories based on the theory of rational 
choice. They thus presuppose an idealised rational individual who is informed, with ordered 
preferences and with the complete inside computer. For her to act rationally is to choose the 
action for which she computes the maximal utility or satisfies her preferences in the best way [3]. 
We can see that both decision theory and game theory are concerned with choosing between 
alternative possibilities and with computing the best outcome. Previous stages of decision 
making process, for example identification of the problem and obtaining necessary 
information, which are as important but may be more difficult to compute, are not 
represented in these theories [4]. 
Decision theory offers us different models that emphasize strictly rational approach and stress 
the importance of instrumental reason and the ability to calculate the best choice. But for 
describing the actual decision making processes these theories based on ideal rationality are 
not appropriate. Scientists were looking for more realistic approaches and Herbert Simon [5] 
proposed the notion of bounded rationality and Christopher Cherniak [6] theory of minimal 
rationality. Empirical investigation of reasoning in everyday situations which are uncertain or 
risky or require quick answers showed that people use heuristic instead of logical reasoning. 
These quick and economical processes do not need as much information as conscious 
reasoning. Some theoreticians take such processes as an origin for “cognitive illusions” [7] 
that are causes of conclusions and decisions not in agreement with the laws of logic and 
probability calculus [8]. Gigerenzer [9], in contrast, argues that these intuitive, unconscious 
processes have an adaptive value and must be appropriately valued. In recent years different Rationality and emotions in decision making 
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“dual process” theories have been developed. They pose two systems, one for quick, 
nonconscious and automatic processes (“System 1”) and one for slow, conscious and 
deliberative processes (“System 2”) [10]. There are also other features that characterize the 
systems so it is questionable if there is really only one System 1 or there are more. There is 
also no agreement if the two systems are two parallel systems, first representing implicit 
system of knowledge and second the explicit, that are in competition, or it is more a question 
of how preconscious processes contextualize deliberation and decision making. We will 
concentrate on emotions (System 2) and their role in decision making.  
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS IN DECISION MAKING 
Recently, many philosophers, neuroscientists and psychologists have pointed out that 
emotions play an extremely important role not only in goal setting but also in decision 
making. The philosopher de Sousa, for example, claims that when dealing with the issue of 
making decisions one can benefit significantly by accepting the hypothesis that emotions are 
active participants in decision making, as they make sure that only a small percentage of all 
possible alternatives and facts become relevant in the process [2]. Antonio Damasio has come 
to similar conclusions, but from the perspective of neuroscience and psychology. His 
definitions of emotions and feelings and the roles they play in decision making will be dealt 
with more thoroughly in the following sections. 
DAMASIO’S VIEW ON EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS 
Antonio Damasio is one of the leading researchers in the field of neurobiology of mental 
processes. In addition to numerous scientific papers, he published three very popular 
books [11 – 13]. His first book, entitled Descartes’ Error, deals with the role of emotions and 
feelings in decision making. As its very title suggests, Damasio feels that Descartes wrongly 
identified rational decision making as being immaterial and separate from emotions. 
In his book, Damasio describes the famous neurological case of Phineas Gage: an American 
construction worker who injured himself in 1848 while blasting rock. In the accident, the thrust 
of explosion carried an iron pole through Gage’s head. However, and much to everyone’s 
surprise, Gage, despite the gravity of his injury, managed to survive and was almost fully 
restored. But from a caring, working and tidy husband he became a completely different person: 
someone who was unreliable, impatient and incapable of following orders. The reconstruction 
of Gage’s injury indicates that frontal lobes (especially the left one) were damaged. 
Damasio was confronted with a similar case – patient Elliot who, after the removal of his 
tumour, had a damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex. After the surgery, Elliot’s character 
also changed significantly: his behaviour became inappropriate; at his work, he showed 
systematically lessened abilities of judgement. Even though standard tests of intelligence and 
memory failed to detect any significant changes, Elliot’s everyday behaviour was highly 
irrational. He was having especially serious problems with systematic planning. It seemed 
that he was contemplating every little detail of possible future actions that never even 
occurred. Damasio describes how, during one of his visits, he asked Elliot, which of the two 
dates for the next meeting would suit him best. Usually, a person would come to a conclusion 
after a brief reflection. But in Elliot’s case, this process became terribly prolonged, as he was 
going through all the possible reasons for and against a given date, until – after half an hour – 
he was interrupted by Damasio with a suggestion. Elliot accepted Damasio’s decision calmly 
and thereby ended his calculations [11; pp. 193-194]. 
Damasio noticed that other patients with damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex have 
similar problems with decision making in their everyday lives. Such situations – in contrast to O. Markič 
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solving problems in the laboratory where problems are limited and clearly defined – always 
contain a certain amount of uncertainty and vagueness. But how are we to explain the 
irrational behaviour of such patients, if their abilities of rational calculation seemed to remain 
intact? The prevailing theories of decision making emphasized the rational aspect of the 
process, as it was traditionally thought that the ability of rational decision making was what 
separated humans from other creatures. As mentioned above, the history of philosophy was 
dominated by the “negative view of emotions”, and many philosophers (e.g. Plato, Descartes 
and Kant) defended the view that in the process of rational decision making, emotions were a 
hindrance to clear thinking. 
But clinical experience induced Damasio to start investigating the roles of emotions in 
decision making. With the help of his co-workers he examined and tested even more patients 
with the damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex. He established that emotional responses 
play an important role in decision making processes both in everyday life and in laboratory 
conditions, which stimulate such circumstances. Since emotional responses were not detected 
in his patients, he concluded that their absence is the source of problems in decision making. 
SOMATIC MARKER HYPOTHESIS 
Why do patients with damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex have problems in uncertain 
situations and frequently fail to act in accordance with social rules? Damasio started tackling 
this problem by investigating the mechanism which enables emotional processes to guide or 
direct behaviour, most notably decision making. He named his approach the somatic marker 
hypothesis. 
Damasio established that, when faced with situations which could lead to different types of 
action, these patients are unable to activate emotion-related memory that would help them 
pick the most advantageous alternative. It turned out that such patients are having especially 
serious problems with situations, in which they have to choose between mutually exclusive 
options and vague outcomes, such as choosing a career or making business decisions. And it 
was already seen that even seemingly simple tasks, such as choosing a date for the next 
meeting, posed grave problems for patients like Eliot. 
Damasio states that an important part of the decision making process consists of the 
comparison of potential alternatives with emotions and feelings from similar past situations. 
Furthermore, the process also involves the estimation of results brought about by these past 
events and potential rewards or punishments that might have been gained during such events. 
This procedure enables us to simulate potential future outcomes based on our past 
experiences and then opt for a move that will lead to the best possible solution. People tend to 
classify situations, experienced under the influence of social emotions and emotions of joy 
and sorrow, which are, in turn, triggered by rewards and punishments, in conceptual 
categories. These categories are formed on both mental and corresponding neural levels, and 
are then connected with brain apparatus responsible for triggering emotions. This enables 
appropriate emotions to come about quickly and automatically. This is how Damasio 
describes the mechanism in neurological terms: “When circuits in posterior sensory cortices 
and in temporal and parietal regions process a situation that belongs to a given conceptual 
category, the prefrontal circuits that hold records pertinent to that category of events become 
active. Next comes activation of regions that trigger appropriate emotional signals, such as 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortices, courtesy of an acquired link between that category of 
event and past emotional-feeling responses. This arrangement allows us to connect categories 
of social knowledge – whether acquired or refined through individual experience – with the 
innate, gene-given apparatus of social emotions and their subsequent feelings.” [13; p.147] Rationality and emotions in decision making 
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Damasio and his co-workers did a series of tests, in which they simulated decision making in 
conditions of uncertainty. They used a psychological test designed by Bechara with co-
workers from the University of Iowa, commonly referred to as the Iowa Gambling Test [14]. 
The test is carried out in the following manner: Participants are confronted with 4 decks of 
cards. They are told that every card they pick will bring them a certain amount of money, but 
occasionally a chosen card can also bring about the loss of money. A drawn card can 
therefore bring either punishment or reward. Bad cards are arranged differently in sets, so that 
some sets are “good”, because in the long run they bring profit, while some sets are “bad”, 
because in the long run they bring loss. The goal of the test is to make as much money as 
possible. The results of studies conducted by Damasio and his co-workers demonstrate that, 
after a certain number of drawn are cards, healthy individuals choose only cards from the two 
“good” decks, while patients also opt for “bad” decks, even though they know they were 
causing them to lose money. Also, the participants’ skin conductance was measured, which is 
one of the physiological indicators of emotional reaction. It turned out that healthy 
individuals showed stressful reactions a lot sooner than they consciously realized that a given 
deck is “bad”. In contrast, patients with the damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex did not 
have these reactions to “bad” results. Damasio therefore concluded that, because of their 
lesions, patients failed to develop physiological reactions to the threat of punishment. The 
emotion-related signal was therefore weakened, which, in turn, brought about problems with 
decision making. 
Emotional signals can be conscious and can make us re-live the corresponding feelings, or 
they can be hidden and automatic. In this case, emotional signals mark the possibilities and 
outcomes as positive or negative (a kind of alarm) and thus help us decide to take actions that 
are in accordance with our past experiences. Since such decisions are made relatively quickly 
and without conscious thinking, they are often called “intuitive”. Damasio agrees with de 
Susa when he says that emotions narrow the decision making space and, simultaneously, 
increase “the probability that the action will conform to past experience.” [13; p.148]. It is 
this narrowing of the decision making space that was lacking in Damasio’s patients. 
Let me conclude this presentation with the observation that irrespective of the final 
judgement on the Damasio’s theory of emotion and feelings, he has given a strong push to a 
further investigation of the role of emotions in decision making. 
DECIDING IN MORAL DILEMMAS 
Philosophers are particularly interested to investigate decision making in the situations when 
the agent is in a moral dilemma. They question the similarities and differences between 
decision making in moral and in ordinary context. Some think that in the case of moral 
dilemma we judge rationally and after conscious deliberation [15] while in the everyday 
situations without moral significance decisions are often left to automatic and unconscious 
processes. Others suggest the opposite. They regard decisions as results of automatic, 
unconscious processes and rational justification only as a form of later rationalization [16]. I 
think that both extremes are missing out important aspects and that Joshua Green’s dual-process 
theory of moral judgement is much more promising. Green [17, 18], has synthesized both 
emotional and rational processes and hypothesized an explanation of why and when each of 
them occurs. 
Green investigated people confronted with different moral dilemmas. One set of the 
dilemmas was inspired by a well known philosophical puzzle known as the Trolley Problem. 
In the first dilemma, named the footbridge dilemma, a runaway trolley is headed for five 
people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. You are standing on a O. Markič 
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footbridge next to a large stranger. The only way to save the lives of these five people is to 
push the stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below. His body will stop the trolley from 
reaching the others but he will die as a result. Would you push the person from the bridge? In 
a second, named the switch dilemma, there is a similar situation as before and a runaway 
trolley threatens to kill five people. The only way to save these people is to hit a switch that 
will turn the trolley onto a side track, where it will run over and kill one person instead of 
five. Would you push the switch? It turns out that the majority of people are willing to push 
the switch in the second dilemma while they think it is morally wrong to push the person 
from the bridge in order to save five lives. 
Green and his co-workers performed several experiments in which they exposed persons to 
these two dilemmas. On the basis of the results obtained by brain imaging (fMRI) and with 
the measuring of the reaction time, Green developed dual-process theory of moral judgment. 
According to this theory, characteristically deontological judgements, as the one formed in 
the footbridge dilemma (“it is wrong to kill one person for the benefit of five others”) are 
driven by automatic negative emotional response. In contrast, characteristically utilitarian or 
consequentialist judgments, as the one formed in the switch dilemma (“better to save more 
lives”) are driven by the controlled cognitive processes (e.g. reasoning, planning). Green is in 
agreement with Hume and accepts that moral judgment have both components. But he 
suggests that the function of emotions in characteristically deontological judgments is 
different from the function in characteristically consequentialist judgements. In the former 
they are functioning more like alarms and in the latter more like a currency. I think that in 
this respect Green’s theory is in accordance with the Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis 
presented in the previous section. Koenings and his co-workers [19] have shown that patients 
with patients with the damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortex decide on the basis of “cold 
computations”, much closer to the utilitarian moral judgements. 
Green has tried to explain why people respond differently to the proposed dilemmas. He has 
proposed a hypothesis that the distinction is primarily based on the distinction between 
personal and impersonal setting. In the case of the switch dilemma, the agent is not directly 
confronted with the killed person and for that reason ratio prevails. In contrast, in the case of 
the footbridge dilemma, the agent is in a direct contact with the person that will be killed and 
is much more emotionally involved. He also proposed other possible explanation, as for 
example that in the latter case direct physical contact is present, or that there is a combination 
of personal force and intention. Green thinks that even if there are justified critiques about the 
hypothesis on personal/impersonal distinction, it does not present a threat to the dual-process 
theory in general. 
IS CONSCIOUS DECISION MAKING AN ILLUSION? 
Research in cognitive science, particularly in cognitive neuroscience, offers us an improved 
picture about the working of the brain. On the basis of the knowledge of neural mechanisms 
some scientists question the very possibility of deliberation and conscious rational decision 
making. Are our intuitions that at least sometimes our choices are voluntary and free just an 
illusion? Namely, if neuroscience will discover (deterministic) mechanisms of our decision 
making – will that still allow us to talk about free choice? 
Wegner [20, 21] has contributed to these worries from the neuroscientific and psychological 
perspective. He analysed many experiments, neurological disorders and psychological praxis 
and argued that “the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct indication that 
the conscious thought has caused the action” [21; p.2]. He concluded: “Although our 
thoughts may have deep, important, and unconscious causal connections to our actions, the Rationality and emotions in decision making 
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experience of conscious will arises from a process that interprets these connections, not from 
the connections themselves. Believing that our conscious thoughts cause our actions is an error 
based on the illusory experience of will – much like believing that a rabbit has indeed popped 
out of an empty hat.” [20; p.490] He supported his thesis by numerous examples and experiments 
from neuroscience and psychology, including Libet’s famous studies on the unconscious 
cerebral initiative [22] and the role of conscious will in voluntary action, experiments with 
transcranial magnetic simulation and examples of absence of the experience of will in the 
case of motor automatisms (table-turning, Ouija-board spelling, pendulum diving). 
Wegner suggests that the experience of consciously willing our actions arise primarily when 
we believe our thoughts have caused our actions. This happens when the following three 
principles are satisfied [20; pp.483-486]: priority – the thought should precede the action at a 
proper interval, (ii) consistency – the thought should be compatible with the action, and 
(iii) exclusivity – the thought should be the only apparent cause of action. The interpretative 
process that creates the experience of conscious will works according to the theory of 
apparent mental causation [20, 21]. The theory tells us that the actual causal paths are not 
present in the person's consciousness. It is the principles of priority, consistency and 
exclusivity that govern the inferences people make about the causal influence of their 
thoughts on their actions, and thus underlie the experience that their actions are willed. 
Wegner discusses experiments that show that conscious willing of an action can be separated 
from the action. Sometimes people have a conscious feeling of not owning an action and not 
being responsible for it, but they in fact are, and vice versa. He also supports his theory by 
Libet’s findings that conscious experience of free will is about 400 ms late – it is possible to 
predict the movement on the basis of the measured brain activity (readiness potential) before 
the subject is subjectively aware of his wish to move. According to Libet’s interpretation the 
conscious will can not function as the initiator of the action, but because it does appear some 
150 ms before the muscle is activated, it might block or veto the process in the brain so that 
no act occurs [22; p.51]. 
So, do the data gathered by Wegner really support the interpretation that conscious will does 
not play a causal role? In my opinion such inference is invalid and can be avoided from at 
least two directions. First concern the interpretation and methodology of the experiments 
while the second points to the rich history of philosophical discussions about determinism 
and free will. 
Let me first shortly present some of my doubts that concern the experiments. Wegner 
described situations in which subjects felt as if they caused the action, but in fact they did not, 
and vice versa. This shows there are situations in which our experience that we consciously 
initiated the action (or that we did not), is wrong. But this does not mean that conscious 
intention in general is not causally relevant. I think it is a hasty generalization to conclude 
from these specific examples that conscious willing is never causally relevant, as would be 
wrong to conclude that perceptual illusions show us that our perception is always misleading. 
I agree with Nahmias that Wegner’s examples show “that there are various exceptions to the 
rule that our conscious experiences of our actions correspond with those actions. But the fact 
that there are these exceptions does not show that, in the normal cases of correspondence, 
conscious will is causally irrelevant.” [23; p.533]. In my opinion the psychological 
experiments to which Wegner refers support only the weaker interpretation of illusion, i.e. we 
do not have direct access to the causal link between thought and action. Wegner is right to 
take our folk-psychological belief in direct access to the causes of our action as false. But in 
contrast to him I believe that this is not enough to infer that conscious intentions could not 
cause actions. This weaker interpretation does not say that we could not have causally O. Markič 
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relevant conscious intentions, it just indicates a false understanding of mental processes and 
of our own agency. As we have seen in previous sections, research in neuroscience suggests 
that taking a process through which a person makes her decision as purely rational is false. 
Damasio’s and Green’s theories suggest that we have to look at the emotional aspects and 
subjective feelings in constructing more sophisticated model of agency [17, 18, 20, 21]. 
In my opinion both Libet and Wegner take as a starting point a very naïve picture of 
intentional causation which presupposes a simple causal relation between a thought and an 
action. For example, in Libet’s experiment the author was asking for the causal effect of the 
conscious wish or urge for the flick of the wrist which occurred next to the action. But it was 
totally overlooked that the subject previously agreed to participate in the experiment and 
therefore to complete the action once in the future. It is most likely that she formed the 
intention already at that time. 
I also think that interpretations of experiments and neuroscientific investigations often 
overlook philosophical attempts to find the solution to the problem. Questions like “Is 
deliberative, free willed decision making possible?” and “Is deliberative, free willed decision 
making compatible with determinism?” are hard questions without obviously correct or 
accepted answers. It turned out that accepting compatibilist or incompatibilist solution largely 
depends on different understanding of involved notions of determinism and free will [24, 25]. 
It seems to me that both Libet and Wegner presuppose a very strong metaphysical notion of 
free will, according to which free willed action is equated with non-caused action. Wegner 
himself said that we could not help to look at our own causal influence as something 
supernatural, that it is essential for perceiving ourselves as humans. “We are enchanted by the 
operation of our minds and bodies into believing that we are “uncaused causes”, the origins 
of our own behavior. Each self is magic in its own mind. Unfortunately, the magic self stands 
squarely in the way of the scientific understanding of the psychological, neural and social 
origins of our behavior and thought.” [26; p.226]. Such libertarian position about freedom is 
close to our common sense western view and is part of our manifest humanistic image [27, 28]. 
It is usually supported by a dualistic position in the mind-body problem and kind of extra 
factor strategy, as for example an immaterial soul or agent causation. It is not surprising that 
such understanding of the self is in opposition to the scientifically oriented interpretations. 
Scientist like Wegner and Libet – maybe not fully aware of their presupposition of such a 
strong notion of free will, therefore conclude that free decision making is only an illusion. 
But this viewpoint, generally called “hard determinism” is only one of the possible answers. 
Some try to preserve this strong libertarian notion of freedom and argue for the 
indeterministic processes in the brain at naural and/or quantum level [29] and thus save 
conscious rational decision making. And there is also a third group called compatibilism. 
Compatibilists argue there are strong reasons that determinism and free will are compatible, 
we only have to understand freedom in a weaker sense, not as something uncaused, but 
mainly as expressing our own control, our ability to do otherwise and to do without a 
coercion [30]. This compatibilist position is totally overlooked by those who on the basis of 
neuroscientific research deny the possibility of free decisions. But as Adina Roskies [31; p.421] 
states: “A view of ourselves as biological mechanisms should not undermine our notion of 
ourselves as free and responsible agents. After all, some causal notion is needed for 
attributions of moral responsibility to make sense. The predictive power of our high-level 
psychological generalizations grounds our views of agency, so further evidence that we 
behave in a law-like fashion should not undermine our notions of freedom.” 
In questioning the possibilities of free will we are relaying on subjective experience and on 
our understanding of the nature and self. Recent investigations in neuroscience and 
psychology have given a new push to old question. But solving the problem of free will is Rationality and emotions in decision making 
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connected to other metaphysical and epistemological problems, particularly the mind-body 
problem. Dualists and libertarians “set the bar for free will ridiculously high” [32; p.124] and 
combine dualistic view with the subjective experience. I do not see why we should accept this 
combination for granted and as a base for the in principle objection to any attempts to explain 
deliberation and decision making as free. 
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RACIONALNOST I EMOCIJE U ODLUČIVANJU 
Olga Markič
Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Ljubljani 
Ljubljana, Slovenija i 
SAŽETAK 
Odlučivanje se tradicionalno smatra racionalnim procesom u kojemu razum određuje najbolji način postizanja 
cilja. Istraživanja iz različitih grana kognitivne znanosti su pokazala kako su ljudske odluke i djelovanja u 
znatno većoj mjeri pod utjecajem intuicije i emocionalnih odziva nego se prije smatralo. U ovom radu ispitujem 
ulogu emocija u odlučivanju, posebno Damasiovu hipotezu somatskih markera i Greenov dvojni proces moralne 
prosudbe. Članak zaključujem diskusijom stava kako su namjere i svjesna racionalnost prividi. 
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